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ABSTRACT 
Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) is a 
promising technology to enhance securely processing 
information in otherwise untrusted environments. An 
important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform 
remote attestation to assess the endpoint’s 
trustworthiness. Commonly, remote attestation is 
used to establish an attested secure channel to 
provision secrets to the enclave. 
We integrate Intel SGX remote attestation with the 
establishment of a standard Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) connection. Remote attestation is performed 
during the connection setup by embedding the 
attestation evidence into the endpoints TLS 
certificate. Importantly, we neither change the TLS 
protocol, nor does our approach require changes to 
existing protocol implementations. 
We have prototype implementations for three widely 
used open-source TLS libraries – OpenSSL, wolfSSL 
and mbedTLS. We describe the requirements, design 
and implementation details to integrate SGX remote 
attestation with TLS to bind attested TLS endpoints to 
Intel SGX enclaves. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Intel SGX is a recent (2015) Intel processor extension 
available since the 6th Gen Intel® Core™ processors. 
Intel SGX enables application developers to construct 
trusted execution environments – called enclaves – to 
perform computation on commodity CPUs while 
achieving previously untenable security protections. 
Even highly privileged software running concurrently 
on the same hardware, say, the operating system, 
and virtual machine monitor, cannot observe an 
enclave’s data in clear text. This is possible thanks to 
changes in the microarchitecture that enhances 
restriction-access to enclave memory by anyone 
except the enclave to which the memory belongs. 
An integral part of the Intel SGX architecture is the 
ability to perform attestation. The attester wants to 
convince the challenger that it is a genuine Intel SGX 
enclave running on an up-to-date platform. At the 
end of the attestation process the enclave has 
convinced the challenger that it is genuine. Based on 
the enclave’s attested attributes, the challenger 
decides whether to trust the enclave or not. 
Previous work has shown that remote attestation and 
secure channel establishment must be integrated to 
protect against man-in-the-middle attacks [1]. At a 
minimum, the remote attestation protocol should 
result in a shared secret that can function as the basis 
for a secure channel. The current Intel SGX SDK 
provides an instance of this concept: remote 
attestation is performed using a modified Sigma [2] 
protocol. After a successful protocol instance the 
attester and challenger share a secret. 
However, a shared secret only partially solves the 
problem of secure communication. Bootstrapping a 
secure channel based on a shared secret is possible, 
but inefficient since it duplicates work. Instead, we 
want to seamlessly integrate attestation with the 
establishment of a standard secure channel. The end 
result is an attested secure channel through which 
the participants can communicate. 
In this white paper we describe our approach to 
combine Intel SGX remote attestation into the 
existing Transport Layer Security (TLS) secure channel 
protocol. Most importantly we do leave the TLS 
protocol unchanged, allowing us to reuse existing 
implementations. Additionally, our approach works 
with existing extension points in widely used and 
well-vetted implementations of TLS. Not requiring 
modified libraries and enabling developers already 
familiar with common secure channel API further, 
eases adoption. The proposed scheme is independent 
of the TLS implementation and we provide prototypes 
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for three different popular TLS libraries – OpenSSL, 
wolfSSL and mbedtls. 
The remainder of the text is structured as follows: We 
first provide some background on Intel SGX remote 
attestation and TLS in Section 2. Section 3 presents 
our approach to incorporate remote attestation into 
the TLS protocol. Section 4 gives implementation 
details and describes the API. In Section 5 we discuss 
future extensions and challenges. Section 6 discusses 
related work before concluding in Section 7. 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section we provide background information on 
SGX local and remote attestation in general (Sec 2.1) 
followed by an overview of the EPID (Sec. 2.2) and 
ECDSA (Sec. 2.3) remote attestation model and the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (Sec. 2.4). 
Readers familiar with either may want to skip ahead. 
2.1. SGX ATTESTATION 
The concept of attestation was previously explored in 
the context of Trusted Computing [3]. A secure co-
processor, called Trusted Platform Module (TPM), 
performed cryptographic operations, such as key 
generation, signing and storing of keys, in a secure 
environment. In addition, a TPM can also attest the 
overall platform’s state and configuration to other 
interested parties [4]. The assessing party is called 
challenger while the assessed party is the attester. 
Based on the attestation, the challenger can decide 
whether to trust the platform by comparing the 
attester’s state to a reference value. 
Attestation is also an integral feature of the Intel SGX 
architecture although the implementation details 
differ compared to TPMs. Intel SGX provides two 
attestation mechanisms [5] depending on where the 
challenger and attester reside. Local attestation 
allows two parties on the same platform to attest 
each other. The enclaves perform a local message 
exchange to assess their identities and the fact that 
they share a common platform. Note that local 
attestation alone is insufficient to establish whether 
the platform or the enclaves are genuine SGX 
enclaves. These facts can only be determined through 
remote attestation where the challenger typically is 
off-platform. 
Intel SGX attestation covers the identity of the 
software running in the enclave (e.g., MRENCLAVE 
and MRSIGNER), non-measurable state, such as the 
enclave mode (e.g., debug vs. production), additional 
data the enclave wants to associate with itself (e.g., a 
manifest describing the software’s configuration), 
and a cryptographic binding to the platform TCB. This 
information is bundled into a data structure called a 
report. An interested party inspects the attributes 
contained in the report to make a decision on the 
trustworthiness of the enclave. 
The integrity and authenticity of the attestation 
report is ensured differently depending on whether 
the interested party resides on the same platform as 
the attester. For attestation between enclaves on the 
same platform, the report is authenticated through a 
report key. For remote attestation, a special quoting 
enclave signs the report with an attestation key to 
create a quote. 
Figure 1 illustrates a high-level remote attestation 
flow [5] where the challenger and verifier engage in a 
modified Sigma protocol [2] to establish a shared 
secret. The protocol starts with the challenger 
sending a nonce to the application to guarantee 
freshness (Step 1). The application creates a manifest 
that includes a response to the challenge as well as an 
ephemeral key to encrypt future communication with 
the challenger (Steps 2 and 3). The application 
computes a hash of the manifest and includes this 
hash as user-defined data when creating the report. 
Including a hash of the manifest into the report is 
crucial, as this binds the ephemeral key to this 
enclave. Binding the key and enclave instance 
together is crucial to avoid masquerading attacks [6] 
[1] [7]. 
Next, the enclave generates a report that summarizes 
the enclave and platform state. The report includes 
information on the platform (security version 
number), enclave attributes, enclave measurement, 
software version, software vendor security version 
number, and additional user-provided data [8]. The 
quoting enclave verifies and signs the report using the 
 
Figure 1: Remote Attestation Example. The challenger 
is off-platform with respect to the attester. 
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attestation key (Step 4). The signed report, now called 
a quote, is returned to the application (Step 5) which 
passes it on to the challenger (Step 6). 
The details of how the platform acquires the 
attestation key and how the quote can be verified 
(Step 7) differs between the two remote attestation 
models. 
2.2. EPID ATTESTATION 
Initial versions of Intel SGX focused on privacy-
sensitive client platforms. The Enhanced Privacy ID 
(EPID) protocol [9] allows systems to be identified as 
genuine SGX platforms without revealing their 
identity in the process. This is important for use cases 
involving client platforms where the service provider 
wants assurance on the availability of SGX, but the 
end user wants to maintain privacy across 
attestations. 
With EPID attestation, the platform’s attestation key 
is established through a blinded join protocol run 
between the platform and an Intel back-end service 
[9]. As a result, the platform has a private group key, 
the attestation key, to sign attestations with. Anyone 
with access to the group public key can verify if the 
signature was generated by one of the many group 
private keys without learning which specific group 
private key generated the signature. 
Instead of publishing the group public keys, Intel set 
up an Attestation Service to verify quotes. Within the 
EPID remote attestation model, a verifier sends the 
quote to the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) which 
reply with an attestation verification report, 
confirming or denying the authenticity of the quote 
and the enclave it originates from [10]. The verifier 
inspects the attestation verification report to 
determine the enclave and platform’s 
trustworthiness. The reply from IAS includes the 
original quote and can thus be verified by 3rd parties 
other than the original challenger. 
The Intel SGX SDK [11] provides the necessary APIs 
and primitives to remotely attest an enclave based on 
the modified Sigma protocol outlined earlier. Note 
though, that the Sigma protocol only results in a 
shared secret, not a secure channel. The application 
is left with the task to create a secure channel based 
on the shared secret. RA-TLS bridges this gap and 
integrates remote attestation into the establishment 
of the standard secure channel protocol TLS. This 
makes remote attestation easier to use securely in 
practice, reduces the barrier to entry and benefits the 
overall Intel SGX ecosystem. 
2.3. ECDSA ATTESTATION 
ECDSA-based attestation is an alternative attestation 
model that allows third parties to build their own 
non-Intel attestation infrastructure. ECDSA benefits 
environments, such as data centers, where EPID’s 
privacy properties are unnecessary or deployment 
constraints, like the requirement to communicate 
with Intel back-end services during each attestation, 
make EPID infeasible. ECDSA-based attestation [12] 
relies on standard ECDSA signatures (hence the 
name) as opposed to anonymous group signatures as 
used in EPID. The quotes used to exchange 
information about an enclave and the platform carry 
an ECDSA signature to convey their authenticity and 
integrity. 
With ECDSA-based attestation, Intel’s active 
participation in the actual attestation flow is no 
longer required. Instead of going to the Intel 
Attestation Service to have a quote verified, a verifier 
can acquire all the necessary verification inputs 
without Intel’s active participation including a 
particular certificate, issued by Intel, to assess an 
attestation. The Platform Certification Key (PCK) 
certificate can be obtained prior to an actual 
attestation taking place. Since the PCK certificate is 
valid for extended time periods (i.e., years) it can be 
cached and reused across many attestations. 
While Intel provides a reference implementation for 
ECDSA-based attestation along with a software 
library to generate and verify quotes [13], third 
parties are free to set up their own attestation 
infrastructure, including writing their own quoting 
enclave. 
2.4. TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the de-facto industry 
standard to secure communication. It has been 
developed since 1995 and is still evolving, with TLS 
version 1.3 being the latest revision. Even with this 
long history, subtle deficiencies are still discovered 
occasionally [14]. Thus our strong motivation to build 
on a standard secure channel protocol instead of 
custom solutions. 
Authentication. TLS not only protects the integrity 
and confidentiality of data but also allows endpoint 
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authentication through the exchange of X.509 
certificates. In a typical scenario where a browser 
(client) connects to a web site (server), only the server 
sends a certificate. The client uses the certificate to 
confirm that it indeed connected to the intended web 
site. 
TLS also allows both endpoints to authenticate each 
other. Mutual authentication is frequently used with 
known client populations, for example, in enterprise 
settings, where only previously registered clients are 
allowed to connect. Again, trust in the endpoint is 
conveyed through the exchange of certificates and 
their verification through a certificate chain linking 
back to a trusted root certificate. 
X.509 Certificates. The use of certificates for the 
purpose of identification is based on a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI). A set of trusted root certificate 
authorities either create leaf certificates directly or 
delegate the responsibility to an intermediate 
certificate authority (CA). The intermediate CA can 
issue leaf certificates “on behalf of” the root CA. In 
the case of securing web sites with TLS, the certificate 
represents a cryptographic binding of the web sites 
domain name to the public key (subject key) 
referenced in the certificate. When connecting to the 
HTTPS web site, the client verifies the certificate chain 
as well as that the distinguished name in the 
certificate matches the domain it intended to connect 
to. 
Besides the distinguished name, X.509 certificates 
can be used to bind arbitrary data to the key identity 
in the form of X.509 extensions. Each extension is 
identified by an Object Identifier (OID). For example, 
the OID for the well-known extension Subject 
Alternative Name (SAN) is 2.5.29.17. SAN allows the 
certificate to list multiple domain names for which 
 
1We are focusing on TLS v1.2 here. 
the certificate is valid. X.509 extensions are not 
regulated. Companies are free to introduce new 
extensions in combination with the products they 
offer. To ensure interoperability, extensions can be 
marked critical. If a client encounters a critical 
extension it is unaware of, it aborts the handshake. A 
client is, however, free to ignore an unknown non-
critical extension. 
Trust Root. With TLS and the use of X.509 certificates 
to identify the endpoint, the trust root lies in the root 
certificate authorities. PKI users trust the root CAs to 
follow best practices and procedures before issuing 
certificates to service providers. Alas, not all CAs and 
their delegates are created equal and some may be 
more trustworthy than others [15]. While browsers 
list hundreds of trusted CAs, scenarios other than 
HTTPS on the internet may use a much smaller set of 
trusted roots. 
TLS Handshake. At the beginning of a TLS connection, 
the client and server engage in a 3-way handshake1. 
As part of the handshake, the two parties agree on 
the specifics of the cipher suite and the server 
authenticates itself to the client by sending a 
certificate. While the client initially encrypts 
messages to the server using the server’s public key 
obtained from the certificate, the two parties 
establish a mutual session key to use after the 
handshake. 
 illustrates a typical TLS 1.2 handshake. The client 
initiates the handshake by sending a ClientHello 
message. The ClientHello includes a nonce, specifies 
the client’s preferred cipher suites and any supported 
TLS extensions. The server replies with a sequence of 
three messages: ServerHello, Certificate, and 
KeyExchange. After the server sends its 
ServerHelloDone message, the client continues the 
exchange with its KeyExchange and 
ChangeCipherSpec messages. After the handshake 
finishes successfully, the parties will have established 
a session key to authenticate and en-/decrypt future 
messages. A detailed description of each message 
and their meaning is available in the official TLS 1.2 
standard  [16]. TLS 1.3 coalesced some previously 
separate handshake messages to reduce the number 
of round trips. Otherwise, the changes TLS 1.3 
introduces do not affect how it integrates with Intel 
SGX remote attestation. 
 
Figure 2: TLS 1.2 Handshake Messages. 
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As part of the handshake, the server sends an X.509 
certificate to the client. The certificate states the 
server’s public key, the certificate’s validity period, 
and domain name(s) the certificate is valid for, among 
other things. The client verifies this information and 
performs path validation to ensure the certificate 
chain terminates in a trusted root certificate. 
Additionally, the client should also check if the 
certificate has been revoked. In practice, this is only 
done for Extended Validation (EV) certificates, a 
special class of certificates used by high-value web 
sites such as banks and insurance companies. If the 
client’s certificate validation logic indicates a problem 
with the certificate, the handshake is terminated. 
During the handshake, the server and client negotiate 
a symmetric session key to use after completing the 
handshake. The specifics of the key exchange and the 
authentication depend on the chosen cipher suite. 
For example, a cipher suite employing the Diffie-
Hellman Ephemeral key exchange, results in a new 
key for each session. A unique session key provides 
forward secrecy, that is even if the server’s key is 
compromised, an attacker cannot decrypt previously 
recorded sessions since each session used an 
ephemeral key independent of the server’s key. 
3. DESIGN 
In contrast to the PKI used in the modern web where 
the trust root is a list of root certificate authorities 
maintained by a handful of entities such as Google, 
Mozilla and Microsoft, we want to use Intel SGX as a 
hardware root of trust. To this end, we propose to 
include additional information into the X.509 
certificate exchanged during a TLS handshake. In the 
following, we explain which information we include in 
the certificate and how this information is validated. 
We stay with the common scenario where a central 
server allows arbitrary clients to connect and the 
clients want to verify the server’s identity during the 
connection setup. In the terminology of remote 
attestation, the server is the attester and the client 
the challenger. We focus on the classic client/server 
scenario to ease the explanation but our scheme also 
covers mutual authentication/attestation. With 
mutual attestation, the client and server assume the 
roles of attester and challenger at the same time. 
The server runs in an Intel SGX enclave and 
terminates the TLS connection inside the enclave. The 
server can either be constructed using the Intel SGX 
SDK or any other framework/runtime to execute 
legacy applications on Intel SGX [17] [18] [19] [20]. 
The server obtains its Intel SGX identity and executes 
the steps necessary to obtain a report and a quote 
from the platform’s quoting enclave. This is required 
to successfully complete the remote attestation 
workflow. 
To achieve our goal of integrating remote attestation 
into the TLS handshake, we have to address two 
objectives: First, we need to link the server’s RA-TLS 
key to a specific instance of an Intel SGX enclave. 
Second, the server/attester must provide the 
necessary attestation evidence during the TLS 
connection setup to convince the client/challenger 
that it is indeed connected to a veritable Intel SGX 
enclave. 
3.1. BINDING RA-TLS KEY TO ENCLAVE 
The enclave generates a new public-private RA-TLS 
key pair at every startup. The RA-TLS key need not be 
persisted since generating a fresh key on startup is 
reasonably cheap. Not persisting the key reduces the 
key’s exposure and avoids common problems related 
to persistence such as state rollback protection. 
Interested parties can inspect the source code to 
convince themselves that the key is never exposed 
outside of the enclave. 
RA-TLS links the RA-TLS key and enclave by including 
a hash of the RA-TLS public key as user-data into the 
Intel SGX report. Recall, that the report is generated 
by the attester and passed to the platform’s quoting 
enclave. The quoting enclave signs the report, 
vouching that the report was indeed generated by a 
genuine Intel SGX enclave on the local platform. At 
this point, there exists a cryptographically secured 
statement of the fact that the RA-TLS public key is 
bound to the Intel SGX enclave.IAS Intel  
3.2. ATTESTATION EVIDENCE  
To assess the server’s Intel SGX identity and link its 
public key to the enclave instance, the client needs 
access to the attestation evidence. We propose to 
embed the attestation evidence as custom X.509 
extensions in the server’s certificate. To this end, we 
introduce new X.509 extensions, each with their own 
unique object identifier (OID). Adding the attestation 
evidence into the certificate is less intrusive than, for 
example, introducing a new TLS extension which 
would require invasive changes to each TLS 
implementation. By extending the certificate, we do 
not require any changes to existing TLS libraries and 
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use readily available hooks to verify the custom X.509 
extensions. 
Extending the certificate traditionally requires 
resigning it by a CA. However, since we propose to use 
Intel SGX as a trust root, we can simply self-sign the 
certificate. Instead of relying on the CA to bind the 
domain name to the server’s identity/key, we rely 
onIntel SGX to provide the identity. If a binding 
between the Intel SGX identity and a domain name is 
desired, we discuss one proposal how to incorporate 
this into the attestation flow in Section 5. 
The specific attestation evidence embedded into the 
RA-TLS certificate differs between EPID and ECDSA-
based attestation as is described next.  
3.2.1. EPID ATTESTATION EVIDENCE 
For EPID-based attestation [9], we propose to embed 
the following items as attestation evidence into the 
RA-TLS certificate. 
Attestation Verification Report. This is the reply 
received from the Intel Attestation Service (IAS) when 
submitting a quote for verification [10]. IAS reports 
whether the quote was generated on a genuine Intel 
SGX platform by a genuine enclave. Embedded in the 
report is a copy of the data produced by the enclave, 
such as platform security version number, enclave 
identity (MRENCLAVE) and enclave signer 
(MRSIGNER) among other attributes. 
Attestation Verification Report Signature. The 
attestation verification report is signed by IAS. The 
signature ensures that report is authentic and 
unmodified. 
Attestation Report Signing Certificate. To verify the 
signature over the attestation report, the client must 
know the keys used to create the signature. This 
information is conveyed in additional certificates 
included in the response from IAS. 
In addition to the above items the verifier also needs 
the Attestation Report Signing CA Certificate to 
establish whether the Attestation Report Signing 
Certificate is trusted. This certificate forms the trust 
root and is thus not included in the RA-TLS certificate. 
We expect the verifier to obtain it through a secure 
out-of-band mechanism. 
Also note that in RA-TLS the attester communicates 
with IAS since it assembles all the attestation 
evidence to be consumed by the verifier. This is 
different to the flow depicted earlier in Figure 1 
where the verifier only receives the quote and 
handles the verification independently. Depending on 
the scenario, it may be important which party has to 
communicate with other external services during the 
attestation flow. 
3.2.2. ECDSA ATTESTATION EVIDENCE 
For ECDSA-based attestation, we propose to include 
the following items as attestation evidence into the 
RA-TLS certificate. 
Quote. The signed data structure produced by the 
quoting enclave. It contains the enclave’s code 
identity and various attributes. The quote is signed 
with the attestation key. The verifier can examine the 
quote to determine whether to trust the enclave or 
not based on its SGX identity. 
TCB Info. Collection of attributes on the platform’s 
state where the quote was generated. A verifier can 
examine this to determine whether or not to trust the 
platform on which the attestation was performed. For 
example, a verifier may decide to dismiss any 
attestation originating on a platform missing critical 
security updates. 
TCB Signing Chain. The TCB info is signed to assess 
authenticity and integrity. The certificate chain 
required to verify the signature is included as part of 
the attestation evidence. 
PCK Certificate. Intel publishes a PCK certificate for 
each SGX platform and TCB. The PCK certificate allows 
a verifier to determine if the quote was produced on 
a genuine SGX platform. 
PCK Signing Chain. The PCK certificate can be traced 
back to a trusted root certificate owned by Intel. The 
attestation evidence includes the entire certificate 
chain. The verifier is expected to check the signature 
on the PCK certificate to ascertain authenticity. 
Certificate Revocation Lists. For the PCK certificates 
and intermediate CA certificates Intel also publishes 
certificate revocation lists (CRLs) to notify a verifier of 
compromised keys. 
Quoting Enclave Identity. The latest identity of Intel’s 
quoting enclave including its code measurement and 
security versions numbers. This allows the verifier to 
assess if the quoting enclave is from a trusted source 
and received adequate security patches. 
The TCB Info, PCK Certificate and Certificate 
Revocation Lists are all signed and chain back to a 
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trusted root key possessed by Intel. The verifier is 
expected to have the root key’s certificate (or the 
expected public key) either embedded or to 
otherwise obtain it securely out-of-band. 
3.3. RA-TLS CERTIFICATE VALIDATION 
The receiver of the RA-TLS certificate must verify the 
SGX attestation evidence contained within. The 
concrete steps differ based on the attestation 
method. Protocol-wise, the verification happens 
during the standard TLS handshake. If any of the 
verification steps fail, the endpoint aborts the 
handshake to terminate the TLS connection. 
EPID Attestation Verification. To verify the EPID 
attestation evidence a challenger must complete the 
following steps: (1) Verify the signature on the 
Attestation Report Signing Certificate against the 
Attestation Report Signing CA Certificate (which is 
trusted). Only if validation passes do we have 
assurance that the report was signed by a trusted 
attestation service. (2) Verify the report signature 
against the report using the Attestation Report 
Signing Certificate to ascertain that the attestation 
report is genuine and unmodified. 
ECDSA-based Attestation Verification. In general, a 
verifier must undertake the following steps to 
determine the trustworthiness of an enclave on a 
particular platform [12]: (1) Verify the integrity of the 
signature chain from the quote to the Intel-issued PCK 
certificate. (2) Verify no keys in the chain have been 
revoked. (3) Verify the quoting enclave is from a 
suitable source and up-to-date. (4) Verify the status 
of the Intel SGX TCB described in the chain. 
RA-TLS Verification. Independent of whether EPID or 
ECDSA attestation is used, the verifier must check if 
the hash of the RA-TLS certificate’s public key is 
present in the enclave’s report. This is how the RA-TLS 
key is tied to a particular enclave instance.  Finally, the 
verifier compares the enclave’s identity (e.g., 
MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER) against the expected 
identity. 
3.4. SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Typically, SGX attestations are produced at time of 
use, guaranteeing a fresh attestation. For RA-TLS, 
since the attestation is produced when the key is 
generated, additional mechanisms are needed. 
First, freshness of the exchanged messages is 
guaranteed by TLS itself: nonces at the record layer 
protect against replays. Freshness of the attestation 
evidence can be determined through time stamps 
attached to it. With EPID-based attestation, the 
attestation verification report has a time stamp. 
Similarly, with ECDSA-based attestation, the TCB info 
and certificate revocation lists have a validity period. 
Based on the available time stamps a verifier might 
reject them as too old. 
The security of the RA-TLS key is ensured by Intel SGX. 
The quote binds the key to a particular enclave 
instance. By design, only the enclave has access to the 
key. An attacker would need to break the Intel SGX 
security model or exploit application-specific 
vulnerabilities to compromise the key. Users can 
inspect the source for code paths that intentionally 
expose the key. We do not intend to persist the key 
across enclave restarts. Instead, a new key is 
generated at each startup and, possibly, periodically 
at runtime for long running services. Usage of the key 
is further minimized when a cipher suite with a Diffie-
Hellman Ephemeral key exchange is used. In this case, 
the RA-TLS key is only used during the handshake and 
a per-connection ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key 
protects the subsequent communication. 
A classic problem with traditional PKI is the 
regeneration of certificates, either because the 
certificate expired or the key was compromised, 
which is time-consuming and expensive. Since we 
root trust in the Intel SGX hardware, we can self-sign 
the certificate. This allows us to have short expiration 
times and regenerate certificates periodically. 
Whenever we change the RA-TLS key, we do need to 
generate a new quote to reflect this. Short certificate 
validity periods and fresh attestations also protect 
challengers from connecting to revoked platforms. 
For example, with EPID attestation, the attester will 
no longer be able to obtain a valid attestation report 
from the Intel Attestation Service if a platform was 
revoked in the meantime. 
 
Figure 3: Message flow for EPID-based remote 
attestation using TLS. 
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For ECDSA-based attestation, if the verifier is 
concerned about the attestation evidence’s 
freshness, it is possible to independently obtain some 
of it instead of relying on the material contained 
within the RA-TLS certificate. This applies in particular 
to certificate revocation lists to ensure none of the 
keys used to sign attestation evidence or the PCK key 
have been revoked. Especially for verifiers that 
themselves run inside an enclave it may be difficult to 
determine if the attestation evidence is past its 
validity period without access to a trusted time 
source. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
We implemented RA-TLS for EPID-based attestation 
using three different TLS libraries: wolfSSL [21], 
mbedtls [22], and OpenSSL [23]. ECDSA-based 
attestation in RA-TLS is currently only implemented in 
wolfSSL2. Overall, the implementation is structured 
into two main components: (1) the RA-TLS key and 
certificate generations for the attester. (2) The RA-TLS 
certificate validation for the challenger. The RA-TLS C 
library exposes a set of functions for use by the 
attester and challenger. The library is linked into the 
application like any other standard library. 
The code clearly separates the TLS library-specific 
parts (hash computation, certificate generation and 
validation, and key generation) from the library 
agnostic aspects (extended validation steps). This 
allows us to reuse the library-agnostic parts when 
porting RA-TLS to other TLS libraries. The interface to 
the RA-TLS library is largely independent of the 
attestation model expect for a structure to pass in 
configuration parameters. For example, EPID requires 
a Software Product ID (SPID) while ECDSA requires an 
 
2 RA-TLS uses Intel’s Data Center Attestation 
Primitives [13] for the actual verification of the 
API subscription key to talk to the respective backend 
services. 
Besides the actual TLS library, we also encapsulate the 
Intel SGX SDK specific functionality into separate 
functions. For example, the RA-TLS library uses the 
Intel SGX SDK to obtain the quote. If the Intel SGX SDK 
is not available, for example, because a different 
framework is used [19] [18] [20] to execute the 
program on Intel SGX hardware, we provide an 
alternative implementation of the required 
functionality independent of the Intel SGX SDK. 
Hence, integrating our library with other SGX 
frameworks is possible and low overhead. 
Next, we describe the programming interface in 
terms of the attester and the challenger. Depending 
on the scenario, either can be the server or client in a 
traditional distributed computing setting. If mutual 
attestation is desired, and this is supported by our 
library and TLS, the client and server will in fact 
assume the role of attester and challenger at the 
same time. 
4.1. ATTESTER 
Traditionally, the server/attester reads the key and 
certificate from stable storage into memory before 
serving it to other parties. It is the attester’s 
responsibility to apply sufficient security measures to 
safeguard the key at rest. 
Instead we propose to generate a new key and 
certificate whenever the attester enclave starts. The 
key and certificate are ephemeral and shall not be 
persisted past the attester’s lifetime. The attester’s 
API consists of one function 
create_key_and_certificate that outputs the key 
and the corresponding certificate. To keep the 
interface generic, the key and certificate are encoded 
in standard DER format. 
 illustrates the flow of messages sent by the server 
when it initializes. The server runs inside an Intel SGX 
enclave. Before accepting any client connections, the 
server generates a new key and creates a self-signed 
X.509 certificate including the extensions mentioned 
in the previous section. The TLS library is configured 
to use this certificate as the server certificate for new 
client connections. 
attestation evidence which uses OpenSSL as a 
backend. 
01 WOLFSSL_CTX* ctx; 
02 ... 
03 char key[2048]; char crt[8192]; 
04 int key_len = sizeof(key); 
05 int crt_len = sizeof(crt); 
06  
07 create_key_and_x509(key, &key_len, 
08                     crt, &crt_len); 
09                      
10 wolfSSL_CTX_use_certificate_buffer(ctx, 
11      crt, crt_len, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1); 
12  
13 wolfSSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_buffer(ctx, der_key, 
14      der_key_len, SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1); 
 
Figure 4: An example, based on the wolfSSL library, using 
the attester API. Functions exported by the remote 
attestation library are in bold. 
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To create the certificate, the server must go through 
the usual steps to perform remote attestation: create 
a report, pass the report to the quoting enclave, and, 
finally, send the quote to IAS to receive an attestation 
verification report. These steps must be performed at 
startup (and every time the server’s key changes at 
runtime). If it is desirable to maintain the same key 
across server restarts, the key can be sealed to the 
enclave’s identity. 
We illustrate the usage of the attester API in . In this 
particular example we use the wolfSSL library to 
configure an endpoint accepting connections. After 
defining the data structures to hold the key and 
certificate (lines 3–5) we call our library function to 
create a new key and certificate (lines 7–8). 
Subsequently the attester calls the wolfSSL function 
to use the newly generated key (lines 10–11) and 
certificate (lines 13–14) with incoming connection 
requests. The simple and intuitive API enables 
developers to integrate our library easily into existing 
applications. 
4.2. CHALLENGER 
The challenger extends the existing certificate 
validation logic. To determine if a server certificate is 
valid, the TLS library performs a standard set of 
checks: it verifies the certificate’s expiration status, if 
the certificate’s content matches its signature and 
whether the certification chain terminates in a 
trusted root certificate. 
All the TLS libraries we have examined allow the user 
to specify a custom certificate validation function. 
The custom validation function either extends the 
built-in verification logic or overrides it depending on 
how it is used. Using these hooks/callbacks, we 
implement all the required changes to the challenger 
without modifying the TLS library itself. 
The certificate validation hook indicates the 
successful validation through the return value. The 
caller uses the hook’s return value to either continue 
the handshake or abort it. The hook calls the function 
verify_sgx_cert_extensions exported by our 
library. If the verification succeeds, the function 
returns 0. Otherwise, the function returns 1. 
The application gets access to the Intel SGX identity 
and platform attributes through a complimentary 
function get_quote_from_cert to extract the Intel 
SGX quote from the X.509 certificate. The quote 
contains information on Intel SGX identity attributes 
such as MRENCLAVE and MRSIGNER as well as 
platform related attributes such as the CPU security 
version number. Challengers use the attributes to 
decide whether the remote end meets their security 
requirements. It is also the application which must 
perform authorization based on the SGX identity 
while the RA-TLS library performs the authentication. 
 illustrates how to use the challenger API in a wolfSSL-
based application. First, we define a custom 
certificate verification function cert_verify_cb with 
the signature expected by the wolfSSL library (lines 1–
9). This verification callback simply wraps our library 
function doing the extended certificate validation. 
Later on, we register the certificate verification 
callback with the wolfSSL library (lines 13–14). After 
the TLS handshake finished successfully, we obtain 
access to the peer’s DER encoded certificate (lines 
16–21). Next, the challenger extracts the quote from 
the DER encoded certificate (lines 23–25). The peer’s 
MRENCLAVE value is compared against a reference 
value to verify the SGX identity (lines 27–29). 
Even though the example is based on wolfSSL, the 
flow is similar for other TLS libraries. The data 
structures and function signature will be different, 
but the interface exposed by our library is generic to 
make interoperability with other TLS libraries easy. 
01 int cert_verify_cb(int preverify, 
02   WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* store) { 
03  
04   WOLFSSL_BUFFER_INFO* crt = store->certs; 
05   int ret = verify_sgx_cert_extensions( 
06                 crt->buffer, 
07                 crt->length); 
08   return !ret; 
09 } 
10  
11 int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { 
12   ... 
13   wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, 
14                          cert_verify_callback); 
15   ... 
16   WOLFSSL_X509* crt = 
17       wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); 
18        
19   int der_len; 
20   const byte* der = 
21       wolfSSL_X509_get_der(crt, &der_len); 
22  
23   sgx_quote_t quote; 
24   get_quote_from_cert(der, der_len, &quote); 
25   sgx_report_body_t* body = &quote.report_body; 
26  
27   if (0 != memcmp(body->mr_enclave.m, 
28                   golden_mr_enclave, 
29                   SGX_HASH_SIZE)) { exit(1) }; 
30   ...   
31 } 
Figure 5: An example, based on wolfSSL library, using the 
challenger API. Functions exported by the remote 
attestation library are in bold. 
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5. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
We discuss limitations and considerations when 
pursuing seamless attestation via extended X.509 
certificates. 
Non-standard X.509 extensions. We embed the SGX 
identity information in custom X.509 extensions. 
X.509 extensions can be marked as critical. If a client 
encounters an unknown critical extension, the default 
is to abort the connection. If the attester only expects 
Intel SGX-aware clients, it is sensible to mark the 
extensions critical. If the client includes Intel SGX-
unaware legacy clients, the extensions should not be 
marked critical to allow backwards compatibility. A 
legacy client may still complain about a self-signed 
certificate. 
Clients wishing to make use of the Intel SGX identity 
included in the X.509 certificate need to extract this 
data. To reuse existing APIs, it may make sense to fold 
the Intel SGX identity attributes into established 
X.509 fields. For example, the Common Name (CN) 
attribute could hold a copy of MRENCLAVE. When 
validating the certificate’s Intel SGX extensions fields, 
the verifier must verify that the Intel SGX values 
encoded in the common attributes match the ones 
embedded in the quote. 
Certificate size. Including all the attestation evidence 
into the RA-TLS certificate increases its size 
significantly compared to established use cases. For 
example, a typical HTTPS certificate is around 1100 
byte (DER format)3 while an RA-TLS certificate is 
around 6200 bytes for EPID attestation and at least 
11,000 bytes for ECDSA attestation. 
The size increase of the certificate may be relevant for 
attesters that establish new connections frequently 
since the certificate’s size dominates the overall 
handshake-related traffic volume. Also, some TLS 
implementations use statically allocated buffers that 
might be too small to hold a large certificate leading 
to failed validations. 
One option is to compress the attestation evidence 
stored in the certificate. A lightweight and fast 
compression algorithm such as LZ can already reduce 
the certificate’s size by about 50%. If the client 
population is stable, TLS session resumption reduces 
 
3 
https://scans.io/data/rapid7/sonar.ssl/20170912/20
the number of times the certificate must be 
transmitted.  
A significant portion of the attestation evidence 
consists of infrequently changing certificate chains 
and revocation lists. While it is certainly convenient to 
have all the attestation evidence available from a 
single source, it may be more cost effective if the 
verifier obtains these long-lived inputs through a 
different channel and caches them. As a result, the 
attester does not need to transmit the long-lived 
evidence with every TLS handshake. 
Self-signed certificate. The attester creates a self-
signed certificate that represents its identity. This 
may pose problems with legacy clients. For example, 
in the case of HTTPS, clients expect a known trusted 
CA to sign the certificate. If the certificate is self-
signed, the client’s certificate validation logic will 
abort the handshake. A self-signed certificate will also 
lose the binding between the server’s domain name 
and the key as vouched for by the CA. 
A solution around this dilemma is to have a trusted 
CA sign the extended certificate. With protocols such 
as the Automated Certificate Management 
Environment (ACME) to streamline the issuance of 
certificates [24], this is one possibility to combine 
traditional X.509 identities with Intel SGX identities. 
Alternatively, if the attester has access to an 
intermediate CA certificate, this can be used to sign 
the Intel SGX-extended certificate. In this way, the 
leaf certificate chains back to a PKI trust root, albeit 
at the added burden to securely handle the 
intermediate CA’s key. 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). For ECDSA, the 
verifier does not know if TCB information or PCK CRLs 
are current. An attacker may break a platform and use 
outdated CRLs to convince a verifier of its 
trustworthiness. A non-enclave verifier can inspect 
the CRLs validity period to determine if they are 
outdated. Due to the lack of a trusted time source this 
is impossible for a verifier running in an enclave. 
To protect against outdated CRLs and certificates, 
instead of relying on CRLs contained in the RA-TLS 
certificate, the verifier may want to obtain CRLs 
independently at appropriate intervals. Alternatively, 
it might make sense to introduce an OCSP service or 
OCSP-staple responses of the API endpoints serving 
17-09-12-1505178001-https_get_443_certs.gz -- We 
used this data set for the certificate related statistics. 
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the TCB info and PCK certificates. Ultimately though, 
even the stapled versions of PCK certificates and TCB 
information may be outdated and assessing the 
freshness of the attestation evidence requires a 
trusted time source within the enclave. 
6. RELATED WORK 
The TLS protocol provides authentication, integrity, 
and privacy for data transmitted across untrusted 
communication lines. However, people have 
cautioned that “Using encryption on the Internet is 
the equivalent of arranging an armored car to deliver 
credit-card information from someone living in a 
cardboard box to someone living on a park bench.” 
[25]. The reason being that it is far easier to subvert 
the endpoint than the channel. 
Leveraging novel hardware security features, like 
Intel SGX, makes it significantly harder to subvert the 
endpoint. Still, moving the endpoint into an enclave is 
insufficient. What is needed is a way to bind the 
endpoint to a particular execution context, i.e., an 
enclave. Otherwise, the system is susceptible to relay 
attacks, where a compromised endpoint claims to 
have certain properties, but the properties actually 
pertain to a third system also controlled by the 
attacker. 
Previously work in this direction [7] falls under the 
general umbrella of Trusted Computing [3] and 
focused on Trusted Platform Modules as the ultimate 
trust anchor. Intel SGX enables a more performant 
and versatile solution compared to a resource 
constrained TPM. Hence, it is worth revisiting the 
problem of secure channel binding in the context of 
Intel SGX. 
In [6] the authors introduce an attestation extension 
to TLS. The peers exchange attestation information 
during the handshake. They used provisions within 
TLS to incorporate the additional information [26]. 
This particular TLS extension seems to be superseded 
by HelloExtensions messages in more recent versions 
of TLS. We decided to embed the additional channel 
binding information into the certificate to minimize 
changes to the TLS library. Introducing new messages 
[27], would have required changes to the library itself. 
Extending the certificate validation logic is achieved 
by calling TLS library hook functions from the 
application. It does not require any changes to the TLS 
library, making it easier to maintain and port to new 
TLS libraries. Complex interactions between existing 
extensions already plague the overall security of TLS 
[28]. 
Armknecht et al. [1] also identified the channel 
binding problem as crucial to the value remote 
attestation provides. Armknecht et al. propose a 
generic protocol that combines key exchange and 
remote attestation to avoid relay/masquerading 
attacks. However, they do not integrate the generic 
protocol into any existing secure communication 
protocol like TLS or IPsec. We integrated our solution 
with three existing open-source TLS libraries, making 
it directly usable to applications building on those 
libraries. 
In subsequent work [29], Armknecht et al. propose 
alternative protocols to address performance 
concerns with software that frequently needs to 
provide attestations. Since our work is based on Intel 
SGX, as opposed to a TPM, these performance 
concerns do not apply. Attestation is cheap and its 
overall cost dominated by the communication latency 
to IAS. Since challengers do not contact the 
attestation service there is no attestation-related 
communication overhead added to the TLS 
handshake. The information required to assess the 
channel binding properties are embedded in the 
certificate and the challenger can verify them locally. 
Most similar to RA-TLS is the Finite State Attestation 
Protocol (FSA) proposed by Paverd [30]. While FSA 
uses TPM attestations, it also proposes to bind the 
secure channel to the attestation by embedding a 
fingerprint of the ephemeral TLS key into the 
attestation. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Intel SGX offers a unique opportunity to enhance 
secure computation in otherwise untrusted 
environments. An integral part of Intel SGX is the 
ability to obtain an attestation on the properties of 
the enclave and its platform. Integrating remote 
attestation seamlessly with a standard secure 
channel protocol greatly simplifies the use of remote 
attestation in practice. We developed a library that 
conveniently encapsulates the attestation flow and 
verification behind a simple API. Using this interface, 
developers can rely on the added assurance remote 
attestation provides their application without having 
to deal with the intricacies of implementing it 
correctly. 
A proof of concept implementation of remote 
attestation integrated into the TLS handshake is 
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available at https://github.com/cloud-security-
research/sgx-ra-tls 
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